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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM K. HOWARD, RUTH N. 
HOWARD, ROBERT D. HOWARD 
and SHIRLEY L. HOWARD, 
Plaintiffs, and Appellants, 
vs. 
MILDRED M. HOWARD and WALKER 
BANK & TRUST COMPANY, as ad-
ministrator of the estate of L. W. 
HOWARD, Deceased, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
9223 
This action is one brought by plaintiffs under the pro-
visions of Chapter 33 of Title 78, Utah Code Annotated, to 
obtain a declaratory judgment, determining and declaring 
that a certain judgment, entered July 9, 1958 in Civil Action 
No. 108689 in the Third Judicial District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, between the same parties, 
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became and is a final judgment and degree, and that a certain 
"Notice of Intention to Move for a New Trial" filed in said 
proceeding, after entry of said judgment, is a legal nullity 
and did not stay the running of the time for appeal from the 
judgment referred to. In order to obtain a proper under-
standing of this case, it therefore becomes necessary to review 
briefly the case out of which the present action arose, to-wit: 
said Civil No. 108689, above referred to. 
L. W. Howard, whose full name was Lucas William 
Howard, died intestate in Salt Lake City, Utah, N ovemher 
30, 1955. The day following the death of L. W. Howard, 
defendant Mildred M. Howard placed of record in the office · 
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, a pur-
ported warranty deed bearing date of May 9, 1945, which 
instrument is now of record in the office of the County 
Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah, in Book 1263, page 45, 
photostat copy of which as it appears on the the County rec-
ords is hereto attached as Exhibit A. 
Action was brought by the plaintiffs Wm. K. Howard, 
Ruth N. Howard, Robert D. Howard, and Shirley L. Howard, 
children of the decedent, to have said instrument declared 
and adjudged to be null and void and of no effect. This 
case was designated Civil No. 108689. This action resulted 
in a judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against the defend-
ant, dated July 9, 1958, (Record 33-35) under which the 
Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
Utah, decreed said purported deed above referred to to be 
null and void and of no effect. Certified copy of said 
judgment is contained in the record on appeal. (Record 
33-35) Said judgment was a judgment on the pleadings, 
based upon the fact that the description in said instrument 
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did not enclose any tract of land and did not contain words 
showing that the description was intended to go to the place 
of beginning, but rather it ended at a point two courses 
away from the point of beginning. No appeal from said 
judgment of July 9, 1958 was filed and it is the contention 
of plaintiffs that said judgment became and is a final 
judgment and decree, binding upon the defendants herein 
as to matters adjudged and decreed therein. Thereafter, on 
July 14, 1958, the attorneys for defendant Mildred M. How-
ard served upon plaintiffs and filed with the court in said 
civil No. 108689 a document entitled "Notice of Intention to 
Move for New Trial." (Record 36) Said "Notice of 
Intention to Move for New Trial" did not specify any time 
nor place for the hearing thereof nor for the hearing of the 
motion intended to be made, nor did it recite with particu-
larity the grounds therefor, as required by Rule 7 (b) (I) 
and defendants did not, with said document, file a notice 
of the hearing thereof, as required by Rule 6 (d) of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and no notice of the hearing of said docu-
ment was served therewith, nor has any such notice been 
since served upon plaintiffs. 
After the lapse of a considerable period of time, to-wit: 
more than fifteen months, during which time the defendant 
Walker Bank & Trust Co. as administrator of the estate of 
L. W. Howard, deceased, took no action to close the estate, 
plaintiffs demanded of said Walker Bank & Trust Co., 
as administrator, that they distribute the estate of L. W. 
Howard, deceased, and distribute to plaintiffs their share 
of the assets in said estate; that defendant Walker Bank 
& Trust Co. thereeupon declined so to do, stating that they 
were unable to determine the finality of the said judgment of 
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July 9, 1958 (Record 33-35) because they did not know 
the legal effect of the instrument filed entitled "Notice of 
Intention to Move for New Trial." (Record 36) Upon 
refusal of the bank to effect distribution plaintiffs brought 
this action, under the provisions of the declaratory judgment 
statute, to obtain a judgment and decree declaring the said 
"Notice of Intention to Move for New Trial" to be a legal 
nullity and declaring the judgment entered July 9, 1958 in 
Civil No. 108689, to be a final judgment and degree. 
This action for a declaratory judgment was designated 
by the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, wherein it was filed, as Civil No. 123132. In 
said action both parties moved for summary judgment and 
on March 9, 1960 the court denied plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and granted defendant Mildred How-
ard's Motion for Summary Judgment, and dismissed the 
case as "no cause for action." (Record 32) The court then 
went on further and made a purported finding that the instru-
ment designated as a. "Notice of Intent to move for a new 
trial" in case No. 108689 is valid and the time for appeal 
has not expired. It is from this summary judgment of March 
9, 1960, (Record 32) that this appeal is taken. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Plaintiffs base their appeal upon the following five 
points, wherein it is alleged that the court erred, to-wit: 
I. THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF AC-
TION AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL ON MO-
TION. 
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2. THE JUDGMENT MADE AND ENTERED BY 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT ON THE 9th DAY OF 
JULY, 1858 IN CIVIL NO. 108689, DOCKETED IN DOCK-
ET 63, PAGE 1709, BECAME AND IS A FINAL JUDG-
MENT, BY REASON OF THE FAILURE OF THE 
DEFENDANTS TO APPEAL FROM SAID JUDGMENT 
WITHIN THE TIME PROVIDED BY LAW. 
3. DOCUMENT FILED BY DEFENDANTS IN CIVIL 
NO. 108689 ENTITLED "NOTICE OF INTENTION TO 
MOVE FOR A NEW TRIAL" DID NOT COMPLY WITH 
THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 6, 7, AND 59 OF THE 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND DID NOT THERE-
FORE SUSPEND THE RUNNING OF TIME FOR APPEAL. 
4. F AlLURE OF THE DEFENDANTS TO CALL UP 
FOR HEARING, FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN ONE 
YEAR, THEIR "NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MOVE FOR 
A NEW TRIAL" CONSTITUTED AN ABANDONMENT OF 
THE MOTION. 
5. THE PURPORTED FINDING OF THE COURT 
IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED MARCH 9, 1960, 
IN CIVIL NO. 123132 (RECORD 32) THAT THE MO-
TION FOR NEW TRIAL IN CASE NO. 108689 IS VALID 
AND THE TIME FOR APPEAL HAS NOT EXPIRED, IS 
NULL AND VOID, FOR THE REASON THAT CASE NO. 
123132 HAVING BEEN DISMISSED, THERE IS NOTH-
ING BEFORE THE COURT ON WHICH IT CAN BASE A 
FINDING THAT THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, SO-
CALLED, IS VALID. 1 
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ARGUMENT 
Point I. THE COMPLAINT STATES A CAUSE OF 
ACTION AND IS NOT SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL ON 
MOTION. 
In dismissing plaintiffs' complaint as "no cause for 
action" the court has dealt with defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment (Record 7) as if it were a motion for 
dismissal. It is a well recognized rule of law that as 
against a motion for dismissal all well pleaded facts are 
to be considered as true. Thus it becomes necessary for the 
appellate court to review plaintiffs' complaint (Record 1-3) 
and determine therefrom whether action for declaratory judg-
ment lies and whether the essentials to such an action are 
adequately pleaded. Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Proced-
ure and Chapter 33 of Title 78, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
establish the requirements for declaratory judgment ac-
tion. Rule 57 provides, inter alia, "The existence of an-
other adequate remedy does not preclude a judgment for 
declaratory relief in cases where it is appropriate." There 
are numerous cases which hold that an action for declara-
tory judgment lies where there is uncertainty as to the 
application of a judgment or the interpretation thereof, 
or where, as here there is controversy as to whether or not 
judgment has become final and binding. The rule is set 
forth in 154 ALR 745, as follows: 
"There is substantial authority for the proposition 
that a real and substantial controversy over the 
validity or effect of a judgment may present a ground 
for relief under the Federal Declaratory Judgment 
Act." 
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Our Rule 57 is substantially the same as the federal 
rule, bearing the same number, and thus what is set forth 
in ALR as to the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act applies 
with equal force to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. ALR 
cites numerous cases in support of the rule of law, as stated. 
There are also a great many decisions of state courts to 
the same effect. For example: 
Bowan v. Belyeu 51 So. 2nd 27 where a declaratory 
judgment was held proper to determine whether a judgment 
was a personal judgment against a certain individual; 
Connecticut Savings Bank v. First National Bank, 
51A907 which held that a declaratory judgment was proper 
to declare the effect of and explain judicial decrees; 
National Ben Franklin Life v. Camden Trust Co. 115 A 
2nd 589 which held that a court can entertain a declaratory 
action to determine the significance and effect of a judg-
ment; 
Stavros v. Bradley 232 SW 2nd 104, which upheld a 
declaratory action for the purpose of construing a judgment 
where the parties did not know how to proceed thereunder 
or how the judgment affected them. 
If declaratory judgment is proper, then the next ques-
tion is whether or not plaintiffs' complaint on file herein 
(Record 1-3) states a cause of action upon which decla~a­
tory judgment could be based. In brief, the complaint 
alleges the existence of the controversy, in Civil No. 108689, 
the entry of judgment therein, the failure of the defendants 
therein to appeal therefrom, the service of the so-called 
"Notice of Intention to Move for New Trial," the alleged 
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abandonment of the said "Notice of Intention to Move for 
New Trial," the request made to defendant Walker Bank & 
Trust Co., as administrator, to proceed with the probating 
of the estate of L. W. Howard, deceased, and their refusal to 
do so, upon the grounds that they did not comprehend the 
legal effect· on the judgment of said "Notice of Intention to 
Move for New Trial." Certainly this sets forth facts and 
grounds sufficie!lt to justify relief under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act. The defendant, by her refusal to concede that 
the judgment of July 9, 1958 is a final judgment, creates the 
facts which compel the plaintiffs to bring this action to 
resolve the controversy as to whether or not the judgment in 
Civil No. 108689 is final. It is respectfully submitted that 
plaintiffs' complaint sets forth a cause of action for declara-
tory judgment and even though there might be other remedies 
available to plaintiffs, under the provision of Rule 57 a 
declaratory judgment proceeding is proper, and the essen-
tial facts having been properly pleaded the court was with-
out justification in summarily dismissing plaintiffs' com-
plaint. 
Point 2. THE JUDGMENT MADE AND ENTERED BY 
THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT ON THE 9th DAY OF 
JULY, 1958,1N CIVIL NO. 108689, DOCKETED IN DOCK-
ET 63, PAGE 1709, BECAME AND IS A FINAL JUDG-
MENT BY REASON OF THE FAILURE OF THE 
DEFENDANTS To· APPEAL FROM SUCH JUDGMENT 
IN THE TIME PROVIDED BY LAW. 
Little need be said· about this point. Rule 73 o£ the 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides that an appeal shall be 
taken within one month from. the eritry of the judgment, 
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with certain exceptions. The running of the time for appeal 
is terminated by a timely motion, made pursuant to the rules. 
It is plaintiffs' contention that the instrument filed by de-
fendant Mildred M. Howard did not constitute such a motion 
and was therefore legally insufficient to stay the running 
of the time for appeal. Whether or not the instrument filed 
by defendant Mildred M. Howard in Civil No. 108689 was 
sufficient to terminate the running of the time of appeal, 
will be discussed under Point 3 herein. In the event said 
instrument is not legally sufficient, then definitely the time 
for appeal has long since expired and by such expiration the 
judgment of July 9, 1958 in Civil No. 108689 has become 
and is final and binding upon the parties hereto. 
Point 3. DOCUMENT FILED BY DEFENDANTS 1n 
CIVIL NO. 108689 ENTITLED "NOTICE OF INTENTION 
TO MOVE FOR A NEW TRIAL" DID NOT COMPLY 
WITH THE PROVISIONS OF RULE 6, 7, and 59 OF 
THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND DID NOT 
THEREFORE SUSPEND THE RUNNING OF THE TIME 
FOR APPEAL. 
This point goes directly to the heart of the present con-
troversy. If the document filed by defendants entitled 
"Notice of Intention to Move for a New Trial" (Record 36) 
was legally sufficient to stay the running of the time for 
appeal and has not been abandoned, then the action Civil 
No. 108689 is still pending; but, if said instrument was not 
legally sufficient to stay the running of the time for appeal, 
or, in the event it was abandoned, as plaintiffs allege, then 
the judgment of July 9, 1958 in Civil No. 108689 (Record 
33-35) has become final and binding upon the parties hereto 
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and is not subject to review. Plaintiffs contend that the 
instrument entitled "Notice of Intention to Move for a New 
Trial" is a legal nullity and did not stay the running of the 
time for appeal, for three reasons: 
lst: It does not set forth with particularity the 
grounds for making an application to the court for an order, 
as required by Rule 7 (b) (I). 
2nd: The instrument is not a motion but a mere state-
ment of intent. 
3rd: The instrument, if it was or was intended to be 
a motion, did not have appended thereto a notice of the 
hearing thereof, as required by Rule 6 (d). 
Rule 7 (b) (I) of the Rules of Civil Procedure reads 
as follows: 
"Motions. An application to the court for an order 
shall be made by motion, which, unless made during 
a hearing or trial, shall be made in writing; shall 
state with particularity the grounds therefor; and 
shall set forth the relief or order sought. The re-
quirement of writing is fulfilled if the motion is 
stated in a written notice of the hearing of the 
motion." 
Let us examine the "Notice of Intention to Move for a 
New Trial." A certified copy of this document appears in 
the record, (Record 36) but for the convenience of the court 
in analyzing the instrument, it is deemed advisable to set 
forth here the body of the instrument in order that attention 
may be drawn to the component parts thereof to determine 
whether or not they meet the requirements of the rules. The 
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instrument is entitled "Notice of Intention to Move for a New 
Trial.'' The body reads as follows: 
"You and each of you will please take notice that 
the defendant, Mildred M. Howard, intends to move 
the above entitled court to vacate and set aside the 
judgment and decision of the court rendered in the 
above entitled action, and to grant a new trial of said 
cause, upon the following grounds materially affect-
ing the substantial right of said defendant, to-wit: 
1. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court 
by which defendant Mildred M. Howard was pre-
vented from having a fair trial. 
2. The decision is against law. 
Said motion with respect to the cause mentioned 
in the first ground is made upon affidavit herewith 
attached and served upon you and upon the min-
utes of the court; and in respect to the second ground 
said motion is made upon the minutes of the court 
and upon all of the records in this case." 
The defendant, in this instrument, sets forth two 
grounds based upon which she declares her intention to 
move for a new trial. Rule 59 of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure sets forth the procedure for applying to the court 
for a new trial. Subparagraph (a) of said Rule 59 sets 
forth the grounds. Defendants appear to rely upon subpara-
graphs l and 6 of said Rule 59 (a). These two subpara-
graphs read as follows: 
"( l) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, 
jury, or adverse party or any order of the court or 
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abuse of discretion by which the party was prevented 
from having a fair trial." 
" ( 6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision or that it is against law." 
Rule 59 (c) provides that when the application for a 
new trial is made under subdivisions (I) , ( 2) , ( 3), ( 4), 
shall be supported by affidavit. Inasmuch as the affidavit 
attached to said Notice of Intention, is not in the record on 
appeal plaintiffs deem it proper to insert it here. The body 
thereof read as follows: 
"Milton V. Backman, being duly sworn on oath de-
poses and says that he is one of the attorneys for Mildred 
M. Howard, defendant herein who appeared at the pre-trial 
conference on said matter. That by the Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities filed herein request was made for 
leave to amend defendants' cross complaint filed in said 
action by inter lineation by adding to paragraph 2 the words 
'containing 2.75 acres, more or less.' That defendant made 
known to the court in said memorandum that she was pre-
pared to offer the testimony of C. C. Bush of the Engineering 
firm of Bush & Gudgell to the effect that by his taking the 
deed in question he could locate the land on the ground from 
the description as contained in the deed. Such evidence 
would bring. the instant case within those cases holding 
that if a surveyor by applying the rules of survey can locate 
the land, the description is sufficient and the deed will be 
sustained. 
"Defendant was entitled to amend her cross complaint 
and the case should have been assigned to the trial court for 
the taking of evidence." 
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It is respectfully pointed out that this affidavit does 
not show any "irregularity" in the proceedings of the court, 
jury or adverse party or any order of the court. Neither does 
it show any facts constituting an "abuse of discretion" by 
which the party was prevented from having a fair trial. The 
case did not depend upon a survey and it was not an irregu-
larity nor abuse of discretion to decline a trial or testimony 
of a surveyor where the fatal defect was apparent upon the 
face of the deed upon which defendant relied, in that it did 
not purport to enclose any tract of land and did not contain 
words bringing the boundary line hack to the point of 
beginning. Such words being entirely absent from the 
description no surveyor could supply them. The statement 
as to acreage was in the purported deed and was before the 
court, but even had the amendment requested by defendants 
been allowed it would not have changed the decision. 
Hence it follows that the affidavit does not set forth 
any facts constituting "irregularity" or "abuse of discre-
tion." The "irregularity" or "abuse of discretion" referred 
to by Rule 59 (a) is a jury verdict "the result of mistake, 
passion, prejudice, or improper motive on its part or where 
it is coerced by the court"; (Moores Federal Practise 2nd 
Ed. Vol. 6, page 3792 notes 5 & 6 & cases cited therein), or 
where the verdict is "the result of compromise," or "pure 
chance" (Moore, supra, page 3794 notes 13, 14 and 15.) 
Or it may mean the "misconduct of third persons toward the 
jury," (Moore, supra, page 3801 note 51); These citations 
illustrate the type of "irregularities" and "abuse of discre-
tion" contemplated by Rule 59 (a) Nothing of this nature 
appears in defendants' affidavit. 
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A Utah case further sets forth the type of "irregularity" 
referred to in the rule. It says, 
"It may consist in what is termed 'packing' the 
jury, or it may be by circulating papers or other doc-
uments to influence them or by extending special 
courtesies to some of them, or by direct communica-
tion with one or more of their number." Paul v. Salt 
Lake City R. Co. 34 U 1, 95 P. 363. 
When the "irregularity" or "abuse of discretion" is 
alleged on the part of the judge it must be a similar offence 
against justice, and the circumstances· must be stated with 
particularity. When they do not the affidavit in support of 
the Motion for New Trial may be dismissed as insufficient, 
as was done in Paul vs. Salt Lake City R. Co. supra. 
Defendants' statement "that the decision is against law" 
is likewise not legally sufficient, because it does not set forth 
"with particularity" as required by the provisions of Rule 
7 (b) ( l) the points relied upon. The requirements of the 
rules in providing that all motions state with particularity the 
grounds therefor, is clearly and thoroughly discussed in a 
very recent federal case, U.S. of A vs. 64.88 acres of land 
in Allegany County, Pennsylvania, decided January 27, 
1960 and reported in 25 Federal Rules Decision, page 88, 
wherein the court says: 
"The government filed a timely motion for a 
new trial. That motion is now under consideration. 
Counsel have been heard at oral argument on the 
merits of ·the case and have filed briefs. As trial 
judge I noticed the generality of the reasons assigned 
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in the government's motion for new trial. Counsel 
were asked to brief the point as to whether the mo-
tion conformed to the requirements of Rule 7 (b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. 
Because I do not think that the motion is in compli-
ance with Rule 7 (b), the body of the motion is stated 
in full. 
'And now, to wit, this 29th day of June, 1959, 
comes Hubert I. Teitelbaum, United States Attorney 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania, by John 
R. Gavin, First Assistant United States Attorney, and 
John F. Potter, Assistant United States Attorney, 
and moves your Honorable Court for a new trial in 
the above entitled matter for the following reasons: 
I. Improper admission of testimony. 
2. Government counsel was prejudiced. 
3. Refusal to admit proper testimony. 
4. Refusal to permit cross-examination. 
5. The verdict is excessive. 
'[2] It is to be noticed that Rule 7 refers to both 
pleadings and motions. Seven (a) pertains to 
pleadings. Seven (b) says that a motion 'shall state 
with particularity the grounds therefor . . . ' (sic) 
Counsel for the government concedes in his brief that 
the five grounds assigned are general in nature but 
he says they are 'sufficiently specific to advise the 
court and opposing counsel of the theories upon 
which the government sought a new triaL' I must dis-
agree. I will agree that the fifth reason, that is that 
the verdict is excessive, no doubt is sufficient in and 
of itself to raise the issue as to whether the verdict 
may be permitted under the evidence. However, 
as to the first four reasons, I can conceive of no lan-
guage which could be less particular or more brief 
than the reasons assigned." 
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The court then refers to the rules requiring particularity, 
shows why they are just and proper. The court continues 
by quoting from United States v. Kresnor D.C. 143 F Supp. 
184, 196, as follows: 
"I do not consider this rule to establish a mere 
technical requirement but rather hold it to be 'real 
and substantial.' " 
The court quotes further from Bigelow v. R.K.O. Radio 
Pictures 16 F.R.D. 15 and Barron and Holtzoff Vol. 1, p. 
405 to the effect that: 
"requirements are mandatory; compliance is essen-
tial to orderly procedure." 
The court also calls attention to Federal Form 19 as a 
"guide or standard" and adds, 
"It seems to this court that to regard the instant 
motion as sufficient to raise the first four assigned 
reasons is to nullify completely Rule 7 (b)." 
Further, in view of an attempt to amend the motion: 
"Regarding as I do the instant motion as a 
nullity, no amendment of it or elaboration upon the 
reasons assigned can be permitted." 
This decision of the Federal Court is likewise the rule 
in Utah. Our Supreme Court in a case entitled in re Appli-
cation 7600, to appropriate water, 73 Utah 50, 58, 272 P. 
225, states: 
"As stated, there are no specifications or ob-
jections either in the motion for a new trial or in the 
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assignments of error that the findings of the court 
are contrary to the weight of the evidence or that they 
are without support in the evidence. The notice of 
motion for a new trial but says: 
'that the findings of fact are not supported by 
the evidence and against the evidence; that such 
judgment is against the evidence and against 
law.' 
"No specifications wherein the evidence is insuffi-
cient to support the findings are found in the motion 
for a new trial or elsewhere in the record. The in-
sufficiency of the evidence is argued in appellants' 
brief. We are left to search through the entire record 
consisting of more than 455 written pages, without 
any assistance from the assignments of error or from 
the motion for a new trial, to ascertain wherein and 
whereby the findings are contrary to the evidence. 
That this court has repeatedly declined to do in the 
absence of assigned errors specifying wherein the 
findings are not supported by the evidence." 
The Utah Supreme Court, like the United States District 
Court in the case last above cited, rejected the motion for a 
new trial, declaring the statements therein as not grounds 
for a new trial, but "merely statements that the court erred· 
in its conclusions to render judgment for respondents and in 
the conclusions in denying the motion for a new trial." 
Certainly that is all we have here, the bare statement 
"that the decision is against law" is certainly not a state-
ment of particularity which complies with the provisions of 
Rule 7 (b) (2) and being, as the federal court stated, a 
legal nullity, it did not stay the running of the time for 
appeal. 
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The next question is whether the document entitled 
"Notice of Intention to Move for a New Trial" is a motion 
at all or a mere statement of intention. Under our old rules 
the provisions of Section 104-10-4 & 5, Utah Code Annotated 
1943, the party intending to move for a new trial was re-
quired to first file with the court and serve upon the adverse 
party a "notice of his intention" and thereafter within five 
days file supporting affidavits. Section 104-40-6 provided 
for hearing within 60 days thereafter. All of these sections 
were repealed and the procedure was entirely changed. 
Under the new rules now in effect for ten years, there is no 
provision for a notice of intention and the law now requires 
the filing of the actual motion itself within ten days. This 
motion consists of two or sometimes three parts. First, the 
request to the court for an order, which must comply with 
Rule 7 (b) ( 1). Second, the notice of the hearing thereof, 
required by Rule 6 (d); and Third the affidavits, if affi-
davits are to be used. The form of motion is set forth in the 
Appendix of Forms, attached to the Rules of Civil Proced-
ure, as Form 20, which is a modification of Federal Form 19. 
The defendant in the district court argued that the 
instrun1ent referred to was actually a motion, notwithstand-
in its title. Appellants concede that the title of an instru-
ment is not controlling, but respectfully call to attention of 
the court the wording of the body of instrument, which states 
that the defendant "intends to move the above entitled court 
to vacate and set aside the judgment." A statement of inten-
tion is not the doing of the act, and the courts have been 
very careful to make a distinction between them. For 
example, in Halliman v. Prindle 29 P 2 202 ( 205) the attor-
ney expressed his intention of asking for a directed verdict. 
The court said: 
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"This statement of respondents' counsel was not a 
motion for an instructed verdict. A motion is an 
application for an order and counsel's statement of 
what he intended to do was not an application for an 
order." 
It is respectfully pointed out that in defendants' Notice 
of Intention there is no request for any order, but merely 
a statement of defendants' intent. 
We come now to the final, fatal defect, in the instru-
ment filed by defendant. Rule 6 (d) of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure provides: 
"A written motion other than one which may be heard 
ex parte, and notice of the hearing thereof, shall be 
served not later than five days before the time spe-
cified for the hearing, unless a different period IS 
fixed by these rules or by order of the court." 
By this provision the notice is made an integral part of 
the motion. No one need err in respect thereto because in 
Form 20 of the Appendix of Forms above referred to, the 
notice of motion is made an integral part of the motion itself. 
The compiler's notes to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
state, in commencing on Form 20: 
"The motion and notice above may be combined 
and denominated notice of motion under rule 7 (b) ; 
or, it may be made separately, either as above indi-
cated or on two pages under separate title of the court 
d " an cause. 
No notice, as required by these rules, was attached to 
the instrument, and no notice of the hearing said instrument 
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has ever been served upon the plaintiffs or filed. This omis-
sion constitutes a fatal defect in the instrument, rendering it 
legally insufficient to stay the running of the time for appeal. 
Defendant in the lower court argued that it was .not the 
practice under the old code, in effect before the new rules 
were adopted, nor is it "the practice now" to give notice in 
all cases. What the practice was prior to the adoption of the 
present rules is wholly immaterial; neither are we bound by 
what the "practice" is now if it is contrary to the rules. 
There is no purpose whatever in having rules if they are not 
to be followed. If the courts have power to ignore Rule 6, 
then they have power to ignore all of the rules. Then we 
are not governed by rules, but by what someone conceives 
"the practice" to be. 
The courts have been very strict in applying the rules. 
The rule in question is discussed in Barron & Holzoff, Fed-
eral Practice & Procedure, Vol. 1, page 387, section 218, 
which states: 
"Motion, notice of hearing, and supporting affidavit, 
if any, must be served not later than five days before 
the time specified for the hearing, unless a different 
period is fixed by the court or by the rules." 
The five day period of time has been shortened in some 
cases for good cause, but if a complete motion is not made, 
that is, the motion, notice, and affidavit, if any, it is impos-
sible later to amend, to file affidavits for example or to 
show additional grounds. There are numerous federal cases 
to this effect. This court is bound by its own decision in 
Lund v. Third District Court, 62 P. 2d 278, wherein it is 
determined that a motion for new trial may not, after time for 
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filing motion has expired, be amended by adding new or 
additional grounds not specified in the original motion. 
~ 
If it is impossible to amend a motion by adding new 
grounds, then it should also be impossible to add an essential 
integral part by adding, after the expiration of the time limit, 
the essential notice of hearing, which by Rule 6 and 7, above 
referred to, and by Form 20, is a part of the very motion 
itself. 
Point 4. FAILURE OF THE DEFENDANTS TO CALL 
UP FOR HEARING FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN 
ONE YEAR THEIR NOTICE OF INTENTION TO MOVE 
FOR A NEW TRIAL CONSTITUTES AN ABANDON-
MENT OF THE MOTION. 
The purpose of the rules above· referred to and the 
strictness with which they have been applied, is for a salu-
tory purpose, to-wit: the termination of litigation. A final 
judgment is a termination to an action and is intended to 
settle the controversy. If the losing party is not satisfied 
therewith there is a right, first of all, to move for amend-
ment or new trial within ten days, and a right to appeal 
within thirty days. If these remedies are not followed, then 
the judgment is final, and its finality is binding not only 
. . 
on the parties but on the court, both district and supreme; 
and it is to support this finality that the rules are as strict as 
they are. Now, when judgment was entered against the defend-
ants on July 9, 1958, the matter so far as the plaintiffs were 
concerned, was determined. Plaintiffs had received what 
they requested and had no duty to go forward. The defend-
ants had the right to move for a new trial or to appeal. It is 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
conceded that it is obvious that at first defendants intended 
to move for a new trial, but so far as the record discloses, 
that intention was not carried into fruitition. Until the 
entry of the final judgment it was the duty of the plaintiffs 
to go forward. When final judgment was entered in favor 
of the plaintiffs, that duty shifted to the defendants, if they 
desired further relief of the court. They notified the court 
of their intention to ask further relief and there the 
matter rested. Plaintiffs respectfully urge that by their 
inaction, the defendants abandoned their motion; if by any 
stretch of the imagination the instrument can be deemed a 
motion. Now it is conceded that plaintiffs could have called 
up the said "Notice of Intention to Move for a New Trial" 
for hearing, but that was not plaintiffs' responsibility. Plain-
tiffs had received from the court all that they requested. 
No longer was it their responsibility to move forward, and 
the defendants did not move forward but apparently aban-
doned any original intent to ask for further relief from the 
court. It is npt at all uncommon for persons having legal 
rights, to fail to press those rights, particularly where the 
rights are questionable; and it is a common rule of law 
that if a claim is not pressed aggressively, the right to do so 
will be lost. Defendants' failure to press the matter for a 
period of fifteen months after judgment against them, is 
more than ample time to justify the court in ignoring or 
dismissing the so-called motion, if there is any motion before 
the court. In Darke v. Ireland, 4 Utah 192 (196), the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah said: 
"It appears from the record that on June 20, 1883, 
26 days after the date of the judgment and during 
the term in which it was rendered, plaintiff filed an 
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affidavit in which he stated certain reasons for a new 
trial. And on the 27th day of the same month, this 
affidavit appears to have been served on defendant. 
This is all that appears on the record with respect to 
the motion. The plaintiff urges that the effect of the 
steps toward a motion for a new trial was to retain 
jurisdiction in the courts over the case for the purpose 
of the motion to vacate the judgment. No such notice 
of motion as is required by Section 1420 of the 
Compiled Laws of Utah 1876 was given. The failure 
to comply with the law with respect to the motion, 
with the further fact that no notice appears to have 
been taken of it by the court or counsel, authorized the 
inference that the motion for a new trial was aban-
doned." 
It should be noted that in the Darke case there is 
nothing indicating abandonment other than the failure to 
give the notice required by Section 1420. The moving party 
merely let the matter rest for a period of 13 months and 
because it was the duty of the moving party to go forward, 
the court implied an abandonment. In that case the period 
of failure to press the matter was less than in the case now 
before the court. At the time the Darke case, supra, was 
heard, the laws granted far greater time within which acts 
were to be performed. But in that case failure for 13 months 
to call up the motion for new trial was considered to be an 
abandonment. The Darke case has never been overruled 
nor modified and stands now as precedent that a motion for 
new trial, if not called to the attention of the court for 
action within a 13 months' period, may be ignored and con-
sidered as abandoned. 
Point 5. THAT THE PURPORTED FINDINGS OF THE 
COURT IN SUMMARY JUDGMENT ENTERED MARCH 
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9, 1960, IN CIVIL NO. 123132, THAT THE MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL IN CASE NO. 108689 IS VALID AND 
THE TIME FOR APPEAL HAS NOT EXPIRED, IS NULL 
AND VOID, FOR THE REASON THAT CASE NO. 
123132 HAVING BEEN DISMISSED THERE IS NOTH-
ING BEFORE THE COURT ON WHICH IT CAN BASE A 
FINDING THAT THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, SO-
CALLED, IS VALID. 
The court in the summary judgment rendered March 9, 
1960, (Record 32) dismissed plaintiffs' case for "no cause 
for action." Thereafter, it purports to adjudicate the case 
on the merits. That it cannot do. Once having dismissed 
the case, there is nothing before the court on which it can 
act. No affirmative request for relief was filed by the de-
fendants, by way of counterclaim or cross-complaint, and 
once the matter is dismissed as "no cause of action" the 
plaintiffs could, unless the dismissal was with prejudice, 
as is not the case here, commence a new action for determina-
tion of the points in litigation. The District Court could not 
after the dismissal proceed to adjudicate those points. 
CONCLUSIONS 
It is the contention of the plaintiffs herein that the 
defendants failed to file and serve such a motion as is 
required by Rule 6 (d), Rule 7 (b) (I), and Rule 59, and 
that no n1otion effective to stay the running of the time 
for appeal having been filed and the period for ap-
peal having expired, the district court and the supreme 
court are without jurisdiction to modify the judgment 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
' 
25 
in any way or to vacate or modify or rehear the judgment. 
Plaintiffs respectfully urge that the matters herein set 
forth are jurisdictional and not merely procedural; nor 
are they matters of discretion. The defendant not having 
made a motion, but only having expressed an intention, and 
not having given notice thereof as required by the rules, the 
essential machinery for staying the period of appeal was not 
set in motion and after the expiration of the period for 
appeal, the court lost all jurisdiction over the case. 
In National Popsicle Corp. v. Hughes, 32 Fed. Supp. 
399, the court said: 
"It would be contrary to sound reasoning, as well as 
settled principles of federal law, to construe Rule 6 
(c) to mean that the court has continuing jurisdiction 
over its final judgments and decrees. The power of 
the court over its final judgments must end some 
time. If the period of termination is specified in the 
Rules of Civil Procedure that period governs. Oth-
erwise the end of the term marks the termination of 
the court's power, in accordance with settled law." 
Moore, in commenting on the federal rules, as amended, 
including the 1939, 1946, and 1948 amendments, has this 
to say in commenting on rule 73, dealing with appeals. 
"The second sentence of the amended rule deals 
with this problem. It should be noted that the time 
for appeal is terminated only by a timely motion 
made for judgment n. o. v. under rule 50 (b), or to 
amend or make additional findings under rule 52 
(b), or for a new trial under rule 59 (b), or to alter 
or amend the judgment under rule 59 (e) ; to be 
timely a motion under rule 52 (b), 59 (b), or 59 (e) 
must be made not later than ten days after the entry 
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of judgment. And a motion for judgment n. o. v. 
under rule 50 (b) must be made within ten days after 
the reception of a verdict or if a verdict is not re-
turned within ten days after the jury has been dis-
charged. 
"In general, then, ~II of these rules provide for 
a very short time, a ten-day period. 
"It should be recalled that under rule 6 (b) as 
amended, the court may not enlarge any of these 
time periods. This changes the former practice, since 
under the original rule 6 (d) the only express limita-
tion upon the court's power to enlarge any of these 
time periods was a prohibition against enlarging the 
time for moving for a new trial under rule 59." 
Moore's Federal Rules and Official Forms, page 
1210. 
In further support of plaintiffs' contention that the prob-
lem here involved is jurisdictional, plaintiffs quote further 
from Moore: 
"In ordinary civil actions governed by the federal 
rules of civil procedure, however, the better view is 
that when the ·time limits prescribed in the rules ex-
pire, the court loses its jurisdiction to entertain a 
motion as for new trial, or for a rehearing, or to 
vacate or amend, as the case may be, and cannot 
thereafter entertain such a motion and thereby start 
the appeal time running anew. Safeway Stores, Inc. 
v. Coe (Appellate D.C. 1943) 136 F 2d 771; Jusino 
v. Moreles & Tio (CCA lst, 1955); 139 F 2d 946; 
Nealon v. Hill (CCA 9th 1945); 149 F 2d 883; Nor-
ris v. Kemp (CCA lOth, 1944) 144 R 2d 1." Moore's 
Federal Rules and Official Forms, pages 1210 and 
1211. 
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There is a recent federal case quite closely in point 
on this entire problem. It is entitled Raughley v. Penn-
sylvania R.R. Co. and is a decision of the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals, decided Feb. 7, 1956 and reported in 
230 F 2d 387. In that case the losing attorney requested the 
court for re-argument so that a question not previously pre-
sented might be argued: 
"At the judge's request the narrative runs, counsel 
left a memorandum of his authorities with the judge's 
secretary for examination. On January 3, 1955 
counsel was informed by the court that reargument 
would be allowed and it was, as the docket entries 
show." 
The re-argument was allowed and the court made an order 
denying the motion for re-argument. The losing party 
forthwith appealed and the question was whether the appeal 
was timely. The Circuit Court held that the trial court 
was without authority to enlarge the time, that the motion 
made, even though heard and ruled on by the court, did not 
comply with the provisions of Rule 7 (b) and: 
"cannot be considered as a motion under the other 
rules." 
Because the motion was defective the appeal came too late 
and motion to dismiss the appeal was granted. It is re-
spectfully submitted that in the case now before the court 
we have a written "Notice of Intent to Move for a New 
Trial" but no motion. Neither is the notice appended 
thereto, as required by Rule 6 (d) and as set forth in Form 
20 nor does the instrument meet the requirements of a 
motion as required by Rule 7 (b); and its is plaintiffs' 
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contention that the instrument was therefore insufficient 
to comply with the rules and did not in the least degree 
follow Form 20. And being insufficient to suspend the 
running of the time for appeal, the rule in Raughley v. 
Pennsylvania RR should be followed. It is further con-
tended that even if the court should now hear and pass on 
defendants' "Notice of Intention," thereby regarding the doc-
ument as a motion, this would not cure the defect because 
the court i8 without jurisdiction so to do. The court in the 
Raughley case just quoted, did exactly that, but the Circuit 
Court of Appeals held: 
"Now is there any way in which such a motion, even 
though not timely made, can still have the effect of 
tolling the period for appeal? Specifically, did the 
court below produce such an effect by entertaining 
and ruling (on May 12th on appellants' motion of 
January 4th). It should be noted that the motion 
of January 4th was timely in that it was within the 
ten-day period, but it was not timely because not in 
proper form." 
The court discusses the problem further and concludes: 
"The action of the trial court here in regards to the 
motion of January 4th must therefore be regarded 
II. '' as a nu Ity. 
The ruling of the court in the Raughley case to the effect that 
a defective motion, even though made within the ten day 
period, and even though acted upon, is not sufficient to stay 
the running of the appeal period, squarely suports plaintiffs' 
position. Adopting the language of the court in US of A 
vs. 64.88 Acres etc., supra. To regard the instant motion 
as sufficient to stay the running of the time for appeal is 
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to nullify completely Rule 6 (d) and Rule 7 (b). If the 
Supreme Court should rule that compliance with these 
rules is not mandatory then it will, at the same time, cast 
doubt upon all the rules and we shall be left without guidance 
In conducting litigation. 
It is respectfully urged that the court erred in granting 
defendants' motion for summary judgment. This decision 
of the district court should he reversed and the court should 
be instructed to grant plaintiffs' motion for summary 
judgment, affirming the validity of the judgment of July 9, 
1958, in Civil No. 108689. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PERRIS S. JENSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
1414 Walker Bank Bldg. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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